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no penalties. These transactions were carried out at a discount of more than
20% compared to their net present value. The total loss incurred by creditors
in the three buybacks is estimated at more than USD 10 billion. This raises
the question as to why the Paris Club creditors agreed to the buybacks volun-
tarily. It appears that these buybacks are the result of the exercise of speciﬁc
contracts previously agreed with the debtors in the 1990s, without receiving any
compensation for this and without assessing the consequences. These implicit
contracts make it possible to formalise the respective interests for creditors and
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Part I
Introduction
In 2005, Russia 1 ,Poland 2 and Peru 3 bought back more than USD 20 billion in
debt from Paris Club members. The buybacks consisted of prepayment of debts
at par with no penalties. These transactions were carried out at a discount of
more than 20% compared to their net present value. The total loss incurred by
creditors in the three buybacks is estimated at more than USD 5 billion.
This raises the question as to why the Paris Club creditors agreed to the
buybacks voluntarily. It appears that these buybacks are similar to the exercise
of speciﬁc contracts previously agreed with the debtors in the 1990s, without
receiving any compensation for this and without assessing the consequences.
These implicit contracts make it possible to formalise the respective interests
for creditors and debtors.
The Paris Club was created by the main sovereign creditors in 1956 to max-
imise their bargaining power vis-a`-vis debtor countries. Club members act to-
gether to reschedule the debt of countries facing liquidity problems. The key
feature of debt in the Paris Club is illiquidity. Unlike bond issues, the claims
are not transferable. Therefore, debtors hold a buyback monopoly with regard
to their creditors. However, creditors can securitise their claims in the market
at a discount. The price of a buyback is theoretically the result of a negotiation
between the debtor and the cartel within an Edgeworth box.
To avoid these negotiations, the Paris Club has put in place rules based on
fair treatment between debtors and creditors and on reconciliation of diverging
interests. On the one hand, debtors were eager to have the right to buy back
their debt at a discount as had been made possible for some countries in the
case of commercial credits (Brady bonds). On the other hand, some creditors,
in the event of early repayment, wished to obtain penalty fees in compensation
for the breakage costs in accordance with the standards recommended by the
OECD:
”In the event of an early voluntary repayment of all or part of a loan, the
debtor compensates the governmental institution, which gives its ﬁnancial sup-
port, for all the costs and losses arising from this early repayment and, in par-
ticular, for the cost stemming from replacing the ﬁxed-rate ﬂows interrupted by
the early repayment.”
These two positions were diﬃcult to reconcile. Indeed, for some creditors,
the principle of a discount was unacceptable because they considered discounts
1For a face value of USD 15 billion, see www.clubdeparis.org
2For a face value of EUR 12.6 billion.
3Peru’s ﬁnance minister, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, expects the Paris Club to accept the
country’s oﬀer to buy back some US $1.5 billion of debt, according to The Financial Times.
The country hopes to save USD 300 million in debt servicing charges annually in retiring the
debt early. [. . . ] The government will ﬁnance the buy-back by selling longer-term sovereign
debt both on the local and international capital markets. Peru’s total debt with the USD 8.5
billion, according to the paper.
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to be concessional treatment. Their position was not to add concessions to
concessions as some initial contracts already provided preferential treatment to
debtors (e.g. decrease of debt stock or interest rate charges) and considered
discounted buybacks to be a ”second discount”. This accounting position did
not take into account ﬁnancial market developments. The opponents of the
discount principle refused for the value of the debt be modiﬁed in any way
relative to its historical value. Reciprocally, the payment of breakage costs
through penalty fees was unanimously rejected by debtors.
For these reasons, Paris Club members chose a median way and a compro-
mise ”neither discount nor penalty fees”, allowing, by the late 1990s, early buy-
backs of debt at par value (in addition to debt investment swaps with discounts
of nearly 50%). In ﬁne, the combination of improved reﬁnancing conditions,
compared to those prevailing in the 1980s and the neither-nor rule of the 1990s
led to buybacks in 2005.
During the negotiations, a pool of united creditors and one single debtor
gathered under the auspices of the Paris club (there is no such link between
debtors in spite of unsuccessful attempts in the past to federate debtors in a
”counter-cartel”). Processed claims include both loans for commercial or aid
purposes and debts that have already been rescheduled. Only the debts due
by a sovereign country or those beneﬁting from a sovereign guarantee are likely
to be processed by the Paris Club. The rescheduling negotiation between a
debtor and the Paris Club results in a new homogeneous scheduling, aiming
to lengthen and harmonise the maturity of the initial loans (interest rates are
rarely modiﬁed).
The 2005 and 2006 buybacks can partly be attributed to the improving
economic situation in the 2000s, i.e. low interest rates and good economic
prospects for the ﬁve debtors. In the early 1980s, when debtors took out their
initial loan, the world long term interest rate was above 10% due to the high
level of inﬂation,. These loans were restructured and rescheduled in the Paris
Club during the 1990s. The disinﬂation in the 1990s led to a sharp decrease in
interest rates to less than 5% as of 2003. Consequently, the net present values
of these debts increased, creating a growing interest in reﬁnancing.
From a practical viewpoint, Paris Club loans can be seen as standard loans
with ﬁxed rates in most cases. Interest is generally paid on an annual or half-
yearly basis and the repayment of the principal is made in ﬁne. These loans
are like bullet bonds and their pricing is quite easy because traditional pricing
techniques are available.
It is important to mention a number of academic papers on buybacks.
Sovereign credit buybacks were studied in the 1980s. The aim of these studies
was mainly to determine whether these buybacks were positive or negative for a
country. These papers were based on a macroeconomic analysis for the debtor
and a model for the buyback in terms of social surplus. To sum up, these pa-
pers resulted in two opposing positions: for Krugman [19], buybacks were in
general positive for the debtor, whereas for Rogoﬀ and Bulow [6], buybacks
were a ”boondoggle” for the debtor. The main limitations of these studies were
that the buyback price was an exogenous factor. The speciﬁc case of ”secret”
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buybacks was studied by Cohen [10].
Buybacks were also studied from a ﬁnancial viewpoint. Brennan and Swartz
[5] analysed the characteristics of saving bonds and callable bonds using an
interest rate model based on a Gauss-Wiener process. Bu¨ttler [8] sums up the
three main approaches used to price bonds: direct pricing of the underlying asset
without an interest rate model, indirect pricing through an interest rate model
with discrete time periods and indirect pricing through an interest rate model
with continuous time periods. Other studies focused on the numerical solving
of these models, e.g. Barone-Adosi and Whaley [2] or Bu¨ttler and Waldvogel
[9]. For interest rate models with continuous time periods, Jamshidian [18]
provided an explicit solution for European calls on zero coupon bonds based on
the Vasicek model [26].
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have been conducted on debt buy-
backs for the Paris Club. In our study, we apply the results of Jamshidian
to bonds with a payment in ﬁne (bullet bonds). For cases with weak mean-
reverting tendencies in the Vasicek model, we obtain a simple solution. This
paper prices implicit options for four diﬀerent types of behaviour and diﬀerent
interpretations of the rules. Finally, we rank the contracts and the underlying
incentives from ”virtuous” to ”hypocritical”.
In a ﬁrst part, Paris Club loans are presented and a model of the proﬁt
of creditors and debtors is proposed. In the second part, European implicit
contracts are priced (compulsory or optional, and individual or collective buy-
backs).
Part II
The debt buyback scheme in the
Paris Club
In this paper, we use an indirect approach with continuous rates. First, we
present our hypothesis to model Paris Club buybacks and then we explain the
interest rate model used. Second, we determine the proﬁts of the creditors and
debtors when buybacks occur.
We assume that the debtor’s debts for a value of K are n bullet bonds
indexed from 1 to n. To simplify, we liken a claim to a creditor, assuming
that each creditor owns a single claim on the debtor. This claims previously
rescheduled by Paris Club has the following characteristics: these ﬁxed-rate
bonds all have the same residual maturity D because of past restructurings.
They have a repayment type similar to a bullet bond with repayment of the
principal at the end and annual interest payments. There are m payments, the
ﬁrst m − 1 are only composed of interest and the last is composed of interest
and capital. The debts have the same face value K/n.
These assumptions are not restrictive. In the case of a mixed portfolio
4
containing ﬁxed-rate and variable-rate debt, the portfolio can be treated as a
single portfolio containing only ﬁxed-rate debt (see equivalence in the appendix).
The assumption of identical residual maturities stems from the rationale behind
the rescheduling agreements, which align repayments. In addition, the largest
debts can be broken up to make debts of similar amounts.
Moreover, we use a continuous rate and we assume that the initial (contin-
uous) rate of each credit follows a normal distribution. It is represented by a
random real variable (RRV) Qi. The RRV Qi are identically distributed fol-
lowing the same law Qi ∼ N(μQ, σQ) where μQ is the expectation and σQ the
standard deviation. We use μQ = q¯ .
Thus, the ith credit can be represented by a portfolio of m− 1 zero coupon
bonds that are the interest payments (nominal (K/n)(eQiD/m − 1) and the
payment at jD/m (for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 ) and a zero coupon bond corresponding
to interest and capital (nominal (K/n)eQiD/m maturity D.
Date Interest Capital
D/m (K/n)(eQiD/m − 1)
2D/m (K/n)(eQiD/m − 1)
. . . . . . . . .
(m− 1)D/m (K/n)(eQiD/m − 1)
D (K/n)(eQiD/m − 1) (K/n)
We consider that the interest rate follows a Vasicek model. This model
has advantages such as return to the average and symmetrical distribution.
Moreover, the use of a normal distribution enables us to obtain analytical dis-
tributions. In this model, spot and forward rates follow a normal process and
not a log-normal process as in the Black-76 model. These properties are highly
suitable for pricing contracts over a long period (maturity of more than 15
years). However, it has the drawback of not excluding negative interest rates
and positive rates that are too high (see infra).
Spot rate rt follows the stochastic process of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck:
drt = α(γ − rt)dt + ρdWt (1)
The spot rate and the forward rate have the following distributions:
E(Rs,t|rt) = rte−α(s−t) + γ(1− e−α(s−t)) (2)
E(Fs,t,rt |rt) = rte−α(s−t) + γ(1− e−α(s−t))−
ρ2
2α
(1− e−α(s−t))2 (3)
V ar(Rs,t|rt) = ρ
2
2α
(1 − e−2α(s−t)) (4)
V ar(Fs,t,rt |rt) =
ρ2
2α
(1− e−2α(s−t)) (5)
In this model, t value of a zero coupon bond with a capital of 1 unit and a
maturity s is expressed in exponential-aﬃne form:
P (t, s, rt) = E
(
e
∫ s
t
Rudu|rt
)
= e−A(t,s)rt+B(t,s) (6)
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with
A(t, s) =
1
α
(1− e−α(s−t)) (7)
B(t, s) =
1
α
(1− e−α(s−t))γ − (s− t)γ + ρ
2
4α3
(2α(s− t)
−3 + 4e−α(s−t) − e−2α(s−t)) (8)
Moreover, rates used by creditors and debtors have a risk premium on top
of the rate described above. This premium4 is considered constant overtime.
For the debtor, the premium corresponds to the spread demanded by inter-
national markets, which is deﬁned exogenously by markets. A single spread is
deﬁned for the debtor. The forward rate for the debtor is:
F debtors,t,rt = Fs,t,rt + y (9)
For creditors, the risk premium is explained by the individual perception of de-
fault risk as well as the preference for liquidity5. Because the rate is exogenous,
these risk factors are entirely explained by spreads. We assume that creditors’
spreads are normally distributed Zi RVV.) with Zi ∼ N(μZ , σZ) average μZ
(written z¯ and standard deviation σZ :
F creditors,t,rt = Fs,t,rt + Zi (10)
We will now consider the proﬁt of each player.
The debtor assesses the value of its credit at t with the net present value
for the remaining payments at the prepayment time (T ) and calculates its po-
tential proﬁt. This is tantamount to calculating the net present value of the
corresponding zero coupon bond at the debtor’s reﬁnancing rate. The debtor’s
proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the net present value and the price of the buy-
back (the nominal value). Given that the repayment is assessed in the future
(T > t), the forward 6 rate of the debtor and creditors and must be used.
The value at t must take into account the discount factor. Symmetrically, the
creditor assesses its credit at t. Its proﬁt is the diﬀerence between the buyback
price (nominal value) and the future payments that will be not received.
The debtor’s proﬁt is a RRV calculated at time T of prepayment via the
equivalent portfolio of zero coupon bonds:
4A brownian process of Yt and Zit with Yt ∼ N(y0,σY0
√
t) and Zit ∼ N(zi0, σZi0
√
t)
is probably closer to the real value but has two drawbacks: it is impossible to have explicit
expression for calls III and IV and for calls I and II, results are close to those with a ﬁxed
spread. Rate volatility σFt,T is replaced by
√
σ2Ft,T
+ σ2YT
.
5 The Stability and Growth Pact constraint may increase the preference for liquidity for
EU countries with excessive deﬁcits and/or debt. Indeed, the Stability and Growth Pact
creates an asymmetry because only gross debt is considered. It favours more ”liquid” forms
of external credit to reduce debt.
6As Vasicek notes, the use of the forward rate at T and not the expectated spot rate enables
us to take account of the liquidity (or term)premium.
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Πdebtori (F
debtor
t,T,rt ) =
m(D−T )
D∑
j=1
(K/n)(eQi
D
m − 1)P (T, T + jD
m
,F debtort,T,rt )
+(K/n)P (T,D, F debtort,T,rt )−K/n (11)
This analytical formula is speciﬁc to Jamshidian’s work [18]. The forward
rate for which the proﬁt is zero (strike rate) can be determined algebraically in
a general case and must be calculated using a numerical process.
However, if α is small, an exact solution exists for bullet bonds. This par-
ticular case is tantamount to a situation in which the mean reversion of the
interest rate towards the long term rate is weak compared to the stochastic
term. This reﬂects the reality of the Paris Club because its use of discounting
with the non-continuous rate yields the same expression.
With α small, (7) and (8) imply A(t, t + DJ/m) ≈ jD/m and B(t, t +
Dj/m) ≈ 0. So
P (T, T +
jD
m
,F debtort,T,rt ) = e
−A(t,t+Dj/m)Fdebtort,T,rt +B(t,t+Dj/m) ≈ e−Fdebtort,T,rt jD/m
(12)
Thus, because (11) and (12)
Πdebtori (F
debtor
t,T,rt ) = (K/n)(
e(Qi−F
debtor
t,T,rt
)D/m − 1
e
−Fdebtor
t,T,rt
D/m − 1
)(e−F
debtor
t,T,rt
(D−T ) − 1) (13)
The debtor’s proﬁt is positive when the forward rate is inferior to the credit
rate:
Πdebtori (F
debtor
t,T,rt ) > 0⇔ F debtort,T,rt < Qi (14)
In this case, the debtor’s strike rate F ∗ is known: it is equal to the initial
rate F ∗ = Qi.
Moreover, it is possible, when the forward and the initial rate are low, to
use an approximation at the ﬁrst order for the debtor’s proﬁt from (13):
Πdebtori (F
debtor
t,T,rt ) =
K
n
(D − T )(Qi − F debtort,T,rt ) (15)
The creditor’s proﬁt is:
Πcreditori (F
creditor
t,T,rt ) = −
m(D−T )
D∑
j=1
(K/n)(e
QiD
m − 1)P (T, T + jD
m
,F creditort,T,rt )
−(K/n)P (T,D, F creditort,T,rt ) + K/n (16)
The creditor’s proﬁt is positive when the forward rate is above the initial
credit rate:
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Πcreditori (F
creditor
t,T,rt ) > 0⇔ Qi < F creditort,T,rt (17)
First approximation:
Πcreditori (F
creditor
t,T,rt ) = (K/n)(D − T )(F creditort,T,rt −Qi) (18)
After using the debtor’s and the creditor’s spreads (with (9) and (10)):
Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt) = (K/n)(D − T )(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt) (19)
Πcreditori (Ft,T,rt) = (K/n)(D − T )(Ft,T,rt + Zi −Qi) (20)
The sum of creditors and debtor proﬁts is the paretian proﬁt:
Πparetian = Πcreditori +Π
debitor =
K
n
(D − T )(Zi − y)
Part III
Pricing the contracts
The Club informally speciﬁes the type of option, depending on the clout and
the superior interests of the creditors and the clauses in the multilateral and
bilateral agreements. Depending on their interpretation of the ”de minimis”
clause, the creditors may make the buyback optional or mandatory. Depending
on the wording and interpretation of bilateral agreements, creditors may grant
the debtor the right to choose which debts it wants to buy back. Therefore:
1. The buyback may be mandatory or optional for creditors. In other words,
the creditors may or may not have the right to reject the debtor’s buyback
oﬀer.
2. The buyback oﬀer may be collective or selective. The debtor may be
bound to make a buyback oﬀer to all of its creditors (i.e. the Paris Club
members) or, it may select only some of its creditors.
3. The buyback oﬀer may be revocable or irrevocable. Either the debtor may
retract its oﬀer, if it deems it helpful to do so, or else it may be required
to go ahead with the oﬀer once it is announced, even if it turns out to be
unfavourable for the debtor.
This means that there are four possible types of contracts:
8
Mandatory (M) oﬀers Optional (O) oﬀers
that creditors that creditors
cannot reject can reject
Collective buybacks (C) Type I Type II
that the debtor must CM contract CO contract
oﬀer to all creditors ”standard form”
Selective buybacks (S)
where the debtor selectively Type III Type IV
oﬀers to buy back the debts SM contract SO contract
held by individual creditors
The collective-mandatory or type I contract (CM) is the standard form for
prepayment buybacks. It is akin to a conventional call option (see above).
Furthermore, the attractiveness and the value of each option contract de-
pend on the speciﬁc rights included in each option. It is already clear that the
options that let the debtor select which debts it wants to buy back (SM and
SO) are more advantageous for the debtor. On the other hand, the CM and
CO options are more advantageous for creditors because they can use the cartel
power of the Paris Club. In the same vein, mandatory buybacks (CM and SM)
are advantageous for the debtor, while the CO and SO options are the least dis-
advantageous for creditors. All in all, the SM contract is the most advantageous
for debtors and the SO contract is the least disadvantageous for creditors.
1 Pricing of type I contracts: collective and manda-
tory buybacks (CM)
The debtor proposes to the cartel to buy all his credits and the cartel cannot
refuse the oﬀer. Of course, the debtor proposes this buyback only if it considers
that its proﬁt is positive which depends on the market spot rate. This proﬁt is
the sum of the proﬁts of each credit. The portfolio of n credits is like a single
credit.
The debtor exercises its contract if it considers that the value of this compos-
ite asset is greater than the nominal value (debtor payoﬀ expectation is positive).
This condition exists when the reﬁnancing spot rate (market rate plus spread
7) is inferior to the credit rate.
Because the debtor only considers the level of the forward rate when making
the decision, the option is only exercised if the proﬁt expectation for the whole
operation is positive:
E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt)|Ft,T,rt
⎞
⎠ > 0 ⇔ E(Qi)− Ft,T,rt − y > 0
7We can assume that the debtor does not consider the possibility of defaulting, otherwise
, it would have already chosen to to do so.
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⇔ Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y (21)
The strike rate f∗ is deﬁned and is q− y¯. If condition 21 is met, the portfolio
payoﬀ is the sum of individual proﬁts. Otherwise it is zero. Therefore:
Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y ⇒ Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt) =
∑
1≤i≤n
(K/n)(D − T )(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt)
Ft,T,rt > q¯ − y ⇒ Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt) = 0
Contract I corresponds to the total payoﬀ expectation at exercise date (T )
in a discounted risk-neutral universe. This approach uses Jamshidian’s work,
which provides the price for European call options on zero coupon bonds through
the discounted payoﬀ expectation when the call is exercised. This payoﬀ is
calculated at T as the diﬀerence between the value of the bond at maturity D
(discounted in T with the forward rate for T at t) and the exercise price. The
payoﬀ expectation is then discounted. The value of the contract is then:
CIT = P (t, T, rt)E (Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt))
= P (t, T, rt)K(D − T )E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Qi/n− y − Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y
⎞
⎠
= P (t, T, rt)K(D − T )E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Qi/n− y|Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y
⎞
⎠
−P (t, T, rt)K(D − T )E(Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y)
As the initial rate Qi and the forward rate Ft,T,rt are independent
E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Qi/n− y|Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y
⎞
⎠ = E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Qi/n− y
⎞
⎠P (Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y)
The price of the contract is then:
CIT = P (t, T, rt)K(D − T ) ((q¯ − y)P (Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y)− E(Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y))
= P (t, T, rt)K(D − T )
⎛
⎝(q¯ − y)N ( q¯ − y − ft,T
σFt,T
)
+
σFt,T√
2π
∫ q¯−y
−∞
−f
σ2Ft,T
e
−
(
f−ft,T√
2σFt,T
)2
df
⎞
⎠
= e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )
⎛
⎝(q¯ − y − ft,T )N ( q¯ − y − ft,T
σFt,T
)
+
σFt,T√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T
σFt,T
)2⎞⎠ (22)
ft,T and σFt,T are respectively the expectation and the standard deviation
of the forward rate (see 4 and 3).
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Figure 1: Payoﬀ of the mandatory collective contract
In this case, the debtor’s contract is like a standard call option on an asset
with a nominal K and a value ST = K(D − T )f∗ − Ft,T,rt) + K. The debtor’s
average proﬁt is the conditional expectation of the payoﬀ:
E(Gain(Ft,T,rt)|Ft,T,rt) = (q¯ − y − Ft,T,rt)+ = (ST −K)+
In this case, the buyback contract is like a call option incorporated in a
Paris Club loan embedded call option. These kinds of options exist in some
bond contracts such as saving bonds and parity bonds.
By analysing the value of the contract relative to the forward rate ft,T : it
appears that it is zero when ft,T  q¯ − y and when ft,T 	 −y. Between these
limits the linear term is dominant.
There is a maximum for ∂CT∂T = 0 and T = Topt . If t ≤ T ≤ D then
CT ≤ CTopt
Numerical simulations8, we get Topt = 13(rt+1/D) show that this extremum
is reached after 1 to 3 years for classical parameters (such as maturity of 10 to
20 years). Indeed, the time value is zero for an immediate buyback (T = t) and
rises proportionally to the square root of time. Moreover, the contract value
decreases quasi linearly and is zero at maturity (T = D).
At the ﬁrst order 21, the contract value could be expressed as the sum of
the intrinsic value and the time value.
CIT =
1
2
K(D − T )e−rT (T−t)( (q¯ − y − ft,T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsicvalue
+ σFt,T
√
2
π︸ ︷︷ ︸
timevalue
)
(23)
8With the approximation CIT ≈ KD2
(
(q¯ − y − ft,T ) + σFt,T
√
2T
π
(1− (ft,T + 1D )T )
)
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Figure 2: Value of the mandatory collective contract
The intrinsic value depends on the strike rate. The only endogenous factor
is the spread as the rate of the composite asset depends on the initial contracts.
The spreads depend on market perception of default. As the debtor wants the
lowest possible price, this mechanism is virtuous as it is an incentive to reduce
the spread.
The pricing for the American call is more diﬃcult. The upper bound for
European Calls is a minimum value for the American call but there is no exact
solution. Therefore only an approximation is possible for callable bonds.
During the initial negotiation, the call had a value C0 = 0. Indeed, the
liquidity crisis that triggered the intervention of the Paris Club temporarily
increased the country spread to a level of y′ (r0 + y′ > q¯). The buyback could
occur only after the crisis and when the spread returned to y < y′.
2 Pricing of type II contracts: optional collec-
tive buybacks
For this contract, creditors could refuse the buyback if their proﬁt is negative.
This condition is the following:
E
⎛
⎝ ∑
1≤i≤n
Πcreditori (Ft,T,rt)|Ft,T,rt
⎞
⎠ > 0 ⇔ Ft,T,rt + E(Zi)− E(Qi) > 0
⇔ Ft,T,rt > q¯ − z¯ (24)
The debtor payoﬀ depends on the cartel’s proﬁt. At maturity it is positive
and equal to the debtor’s proﬁt expectation (
∑
1≤i≤n Π
debtor
i (Ft,T,rt)) when its
expectation and that of the cartel are positive (conditions (21) and (24)). It is
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Figure 3: Payoﬀ for the optional collective buyback
zero in other cases, that is to say when the proﬁt expectation of the debtor or
the Club is negative. Therefore:
(Ft,T,rt > q¯ − z¯) ∧ (Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y)
⇒ Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt) =
∑
1≤i≤n
K
n
(D − T )(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt)
(Ft,T,rt < q¯ − z¯) ∨ (Ft,T,rt > q¯ − y)
⇒ Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt) = 0
The condition can also be expressed as q¯ − z¯ < Ft,T,rt < q¯ − y , possible
only if z¯ > y that is to say when there is a paretian payoﬀ (positive sum game);
when creditors consider the debtor risk to be at a higher level than the market.
This contract combines the plain-vanilla call option under the mandatory
collective contract and an ”asset-or-nothing put option9. This asset-or-nothing
put option is broken down into a plain-vanilla put option and a cash-or-nothing
put option for an amount equal to the Pareto payoﬀ.
9The asset or nothing put option is a binary put option with a price equal to the value of the
asset or zero: A binary option is a type of option where the payoﬀ is either some ﬁxed amount
of some asset or nothing at all. The two main types of binary options are the cash-or-nothing
binary option and the asset-or-nothing binary option. The cash-or-nothing binary option pays
some ﬁxed amount of cash if the option expires in-the-money while the asset-or-nothing pays
the value of the underlying security. Thus, the options are binary in nature because their are
only two possible outcomes. They are also called all or nothing options or digital options. For
example, suppose I buy a binary cash-or-nothing call option on XYZ Corp’s stock struck at
$100 with a binary payoﬀ of $1000. Then if at the future maturity date, the stock is trading
at or above $100, I receive $1000. If it stock is trading below $100, I receive nothing.(source:
Wikipedia)
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Figure 4: Breakdown into a standard call, a standard put and a binary put
By discounting the expectation of the payoﬀ we obtain, as above, the con-
tract value
CIIT = P (t, T, rt)E (Payoﬀ T (Ft,T,rt))
= e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )
(
N
(
q¯ − y − ft,T
σFt,T
)
−N
(
q¯ − z¯ − ft,T
σFt,T
))
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )σFt,T√
2π
⎛
⎝e− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T
σFt,T
)2
− e−
1
2
(
q¯−z¯−ft,T
σFt,T
)2⎞⎠ (25)
The contract value relative to the forward rate ft,T is zero ft,T  q¯ − y or
ft,T 	 q¯ − z¯.
An approximation of (25) gives:
CIIT = e
−rt(T−t)K(D − T ) 1
2σFt,T
√
2π
(z¯ − y)2 (26)
This diﬀerential breaks down into the value of the plain-vanilla put option
and the cash-or-nothing put option on the Pareto gain.
It should be noted that the approximated value of the contract shows no
ﬁrst order dependence on the level of future interest rates.
Furthermore, this contract encourages virtuous behaviour in appearance
only. The debtor’s gain-maximising strategy does indeed consist of reducing
the market spread y which constitutes virtuous behaviour. But it is also in the
debtor’s interest to increase his creditors’ spread z¯, meaning their perception of
the debtor’s speciﬁc risk. This type of behaviour may give rise to contradictory
14
Figure 5: Price of the mandatory collective call
speciﬁc signals, or even putting on a virtuous front for the markets, while trying
to make creditors wary at the same time. Therefore, this form of contract is
likely to give rise to speciﬁc default behaviour.
3 Pricing of type III contracts: mandatory se-
lective buybacks
Under a mandatory selective buyback contract, the debtor may choose to prepay
only those debts where its proﬁt will be positive, meaning debts where the initial
rate is higher than the current rate, plus the spread. Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt) > 0
As a consequence, the condition to exercise each option (see (9)) is
Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt) > 0⇔ Ft,T,rt < Qi − y (27)
The payoﬀ on each option is equal to the debtor’s proﬁt on each credit when
the exercise condition is checked (27); it is zero in other cases:
Ft,T,rt < Qi − y ⇒ Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt) = Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt)
=
K
n
(D − T )(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt)
Ft,T,rt > Qi − y ⇒ Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt) = 0
The contract value is the discounted expectation of the sum of payoﬀs on
the whole credit. It is also the sum of the value of contracts (the same) on each
credit:
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CIIIT = P (t, T, rt)
∑
1≤i≤n
E
(
Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt)
)
= P (t, T, rt)
K
n
(D − T )
∑
1≤i≤n
E(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt | − y < Ft,T,rt < Qi − y)
The conditional expectation could be expressed by neglecting the second
order terms:
E(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt < Qi − y) ≈ E(Qi − y)− E(Qi − y|Qi − y < Ft,T,rt)
−E(Ft,T,rt) + E(Ft,T,rt |Qi − y < Ft,T,rt)
The conditional expectations E(Qi − y|Qi − y < Ft,T,rt) and E(Ft,T,rt |Qi −
y < Ft,T,rt) could be calculated by using the lemma presented in Appendix I.
Hence:
E(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt | − y < Ft,T,rt < Qi − y) =
(q¯ − y − ft,T )N
⎛
⎝ q¯ − y − ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
⎞
⎠+
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
)2
(28)
So
CIIIT = e
−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )N
⎛
⎝ q¯ − y − ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
⎞
⎠
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
)2
(29)
It appears that when σQ = 0 (that is to say creditors have the same char-
acteristics and adopt the same behaviour, they behave in the same way as
the cartel), contract value is equal to the value of the ﬁrst type of contract
CIT = C
III
T .
At the ﬁrst order, the contract value is (see (29))
CIIIT =
1
2
K(D − T )e−rT (T−t)
⎛
⎜⎜⎝(q¯ − y − ft,T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsicvalue
+
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
√
2
π︸ ︷︷ ︸
timevalue
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (30)
This result shows that the behaviour of contract III is identical to type I
and does not depend on the strike rate f∗ = q¯ − y. These contract incentives
are virtuous in the case of contract I.
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Figure 6: Payoﬀs of the mandatory collective contract and the mandatory se-
lective contract
Moreover, the average payoﬀ is:
E (Payoﬀ (Ft,T,rt)|Ft,T,rt) = (q¯−y−Ft,T,rt)N
(
q¯ − y − Ft,T,rt
σQ
)
− σQ√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−Ft,T,rt
σQ
)2
A comparison with the collective contract shows that the ”intrinsic” terms
are identical. The diﬀerential between these two contracts is positive (the se-
lective contract is favourable to the debtor).
4 Pricing of type IV contracts: optional selec-
tive buybacks
Under an optional selective buyback, the debtor oﬀers to buy back debts when
both the debtor’s proﬁt and the creditor’s proﬁt are positive. Only creditors
whose payoﬀ is positive accept the buyback. The debtor’s total proﬁt expecta-
tion is therefore the conditional expectation on the creditor’s proﬁts when the
latter are positive.
As a consequence, the condition to exercise each option (see 20 and 27) is
(Πcreditori (Ft,T,rt) > 0) ∧ (Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt) > 0)⇔ Qi − Zi < Ft,T,rt < Qi − y
The payoﬀ is then
Ft,T,rt > Qi − Zi) ∧ (Ft,T,rt < Qi − y)
⇒ Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt) = Πdebtori (Ft,T,rt) =
K
n
(D − T )(Qi − y − Ft,T,rt)
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(Ft,T,rt < Qi − Zi) ∨ (Ft,T,rt > Qi − y)
⇒ Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt) = 0
The contract value is
CIVT = P (t, T, rt)
∑
1≤i≤n
E
(
Payoﬀ iT (Ft,T,rt)
)
= P (t, T, rt)(K/n)(D − T )
∑
1≤i≤n
E(Qi − Ft,T,rt − y|Qi − Zi < Ft,T,rt < Qi − y)
By neglecting the second order terms conditions:
E(Qi − Ft,T,rt − y|Qi − Zi < Ft,T,rt < Qi − y) = E(Qi − y)
−E(Qi − y|Qi − y < Ft,T,rt)
−E(Qi − y|Ft,T,rt + Zi − y < Qi − y)
−E(Ft,T,rt)
+E(Ft,T,rt |Qi − y < Ft,T,rt)
+E(Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt < y − Zi)
With the lemma (see Appendix I) applied to E(Qi − y|Qi − y < Ft,T,rt),
E(Qi−y|Ft,T,rt+Zi−y < Qi−y) , E(Ft,T,rt |Qi−y < Ft,T,rt) and E(Ft,T,rt |Ft,T,rt <
y − Zi) and with the sum on all the credits, we obtain:
CIVT ≈ e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )
⎛
⎝N
⎛
⎝ z¯ − q¯ + ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
+ σ2Z
⎞
⎠−N
⎛
⎝ y − q¯ + ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )σ
2
Q + σ
2
Ft,T√
2π
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
e
− 12
(
y−q¯+ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
)2
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
− e
− 12
(
z¯−q¯+ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
+σ2
Z
)2
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
+ σ2Z
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Moreover the average payoﬀ is:
E (Payoﬀ (Ft,T,rt)|Ft,T,rt) = K(D − T )
(q¯ − y − Ft,T,rt)
⎛
⎝N ( q¯ − y − Ft,T,rt
σQ
)
−N
⎛
⎝ q¯ − z¯ − Ft,T,rt√
σ2Q + σ
2
Z
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
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Figure 7: Comparison of the payoﬀs for the optional collective contract and
optional selective contract
+K(D − T ) σ
2
Q√
2π
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−Ft,T,rt
σQ
)2
σQ
− e
− 12
(
q¯−z¯−Ft,T,rt√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Z
)2
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Z
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
With  = σZ√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
, we obtain at the ﬁrst order
CIVT ≈ e−rt(T−t)K(D−T )
1
2
√
2π
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
(
(z¯ − y)2 + 
2
2
(q¯ − y − ft,T )52(q¯ − ft,T − z¯)
)
(31)
This approximated value, as in the case of contract II, does not depend on
the interest rate but on the paretian payoﬀ.
For extreme rates, this payoﬀ is zero. Indeed, as in the optional collective
contract, a buyback is possible only when the proﬁts of the debtor and the cred-
itors are positive. The incentive is similar to that produced by the mandatory
selective contract. This type of option may give rise to ”hypocritically” virtuous
behaviour.
The value for the contracts can be summarised as follows:
CIT = e
−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )N
(
q¯ − y − ft,T
σFt,T
)
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )σFt,T√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T
σFt,T
)2
CIIT = e
−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )
(
N
(
q¯ − y − ft,T
σFt,T
)
−N
(
q¯ − z¯ − ft,T
σFt,T
))
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )σFt,T√
2π
⎛
⎝e− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T
σFt,T
)2
− e−
1
2
(
q¯−z¯−ft,T
σFt,T
)2⎞⎠
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CIIIT = e
−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )N
⎛
⎝ q¯ − y − ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
⎞
⎠
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T√
2π
e
− 12
(
q¯−y−ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
)2
CIVT ≈ e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )(q¯ − y − ft,T )
⎛
⎝N
⎛
⎝ z¯ − q¯ + ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
+ σ2Z
⎞
⎠−N
⎛
⎝ y − q¯ + ft,T√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠
+e−rt(T−t)K(D − T )σ
2
Q + σ
2
Ft,T√
2π
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
e
− 12
(
y−q¯+ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
)2
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
− e
− 12
(
z¯−q¯+ft,T√
σ2
Q
+σ2
Ft,T
+σ2
Z
)2
√
σ2Q + σ
2
Ft,T
+ σ2Z
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
As regards irrevocable vs. revocable buyback oﬀers, the following point must
be stressed. Logically, the debtor will only exercise the option when his payoﬀ
is positive. Consequently, the debtor is not concerned about sustaining losses
(except if exogenous variables were to change between the time the buyback
is announced and the time it is completed). Therefore, the debtor enjoys an
implicit right to retract the buyback oﬀer. This reasoning holds for mandatory
contracts where all of the information is known.
Part IV
Numerical simulations
The numerical simulations with the following parameters conﬁrm that the max-
imal value for the European type I and III contracts occur after approximately
two years. The computed value for the type IV contract is eﬀectively a lower
bound value as it should be higher than the value of the type II contract.
Type I : 4,7% Type II : 2,1%
Type III : 5,2% Type IV : 2.1%
The average initial rates of the debt contracted in the 1990s was at approxi-
mately 8% (q¯) with a standard deviation of 2% (σQ). The market spread could
amount to 300 basis points y. For such parameters, the strike rate for a type I
contract was 5% (8%-3%). When taking a long-term interest rate of 5% equal
to the initial spot rate –implying a zero intrinsic value-with a standard devia-
tion of 2% and a residual maturity of 10 years, the value of the type I contract
amounts to at least 11.7% of the face value.
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Figure 8: Numerical simulations of the contracts
From top to bottom: type III, I, II and IV. As abscissa: time to exercise (in
years). As ordinate; the value of the contract as a fraction of the principal.
Part V
Conclusion
Mandatory buyback contracts carry a relatively high implicit cost. However,
optional buybacks have a fairly low value, but they may have a perverse ef-
fect in that the debtor may be tempted to put on a reassuring front for the
markets and another, more troubling, front for its main creditors. This is why
the arrangement for buybacks at par does not seem appropriate for optimal
management of the liquidity of the Club’s claims. The discounted buyback ar-
rangement conceived by the Club Secretariat seems clearly preferable, since it
may be carried out at any time and it limits risks and moral hazard.
Several further developments may be considered. More speciﬁcally, it might
be a good idea to price American-style call options for these four types of con-
tracts. Furthermore, we could investigate the dynamics between the debtor and
the creditors from the point of view of the debtor’s strategy for inﬂuencing the
market and the creditors’ perception of its risk. We could also look at pricing
the supplementary option resulting from the revocability of buyback oﬀers.
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Appendix I
Demonstration of lemma
If X and Y are normal X ∼ N(μX , σX) and Y ∼ N(μY , σY ) then
E(X |X > Y ) = μXN
(
μX − μY√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
)
+
σ2X√
2π
√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
e
− 12
(
μX−μY√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
)2
E(X |X > Y ) = μXN
(
−μX + μY√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
)
− σ
2
X√
2π
√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
e
− 12
(
μX−μY√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
)2
By deﬁnition E(X |X > Y ) = ∫ ∫−∞<y<x<+∞ xf X(x)fY (y)dxdy
After changing variables: {
x = u + v
y = u− v∫ ∫
−∞<y<x<+∞
xf X(x)fY (y)dxdy =
∫ ∫
v>0and−∞<u<+∞
(u+v)fX(u+v)fY (u−v) |J(u, v)| dudv
with Jacobian |J(u, v)| = 2
E(X |X > Y ) =
∫ ∫
v>0
2(u + v)fX(u + v)fY (u− v) |J(u, v)| dudv
=
∫ ∫
v>0and−∞<u<+∞
u + v
πσXσY
e
− 12
(
u+v−μX
σX
)2
e
− 12
(
u−v−μY
σY
)2
dudv
=
1
πσXσY
∫ ∫
v>0and−∞<u<+∞
(u + v)e−
1
2 (au
2−2u(b+cv))2e−
1
2 (av
2−2dv+e)2dudv
=
1
πσXσY
∫ +∞
0
e−
1
2 (av
2−2dv+e)2
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
∫ +∞
−∞
(u + v)e−
1
2 (au
2−2u(b+cv))2du︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ dv
with
a =
σ2X + σ
2
Y
(σXσY )2
b =
σ2XμY + σ
2
Y μX
(σXσY )2
c =
σ2X − σ2Y
(σXσY )2
d =
−σ2XμY + σ2Y μX
(σXσY )2
e =
σ2Xμ
2
Y + σ
2
Y μ
2
X
(σXσY )2
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The ﬁrst integral is
I =
∫ +∞
−∞
(u + v)e−
1
2 (au
2−2u(b+cv))2du
=
∫ +∞
−∞
ue−
1
2 (au
2−2u(b+cv))2du +
∫ +∞
−∞
ve−
1
2 (au
2−2u(b+cv))2du
I = e
(cv+b)2
2 a
(∫ +∞
−∞
(√
a
2
u− cv + b√
2
a
)
e
−
(√
a
2u− cv+b√2 a
)2
du +
cv + b√
2
a
∫ +∞
−∞
e
−
(√
a
2u− cv+b√2 a
)2
du
)
+ve
(cv+b)2
2 a
∫ +∞
−∞
e
−
(√
a
2u− cv+b√2 a
)2
du
= e
(cv+b)2
2 a
(
cv + b
a
√
a
√
2π
)
+ ve
(cv+b)2
2 a
1√
a
√
2π
= e
(cv+b)2
2 a
√
2π
a
√
a
(cv + b + av )
Then
E(X |X > Y ) = 1
πσXσY
∫ +∞
0
e−
1
2 (av
2−2dv+e)2Idv
=
1
πσXσY
∫ +∞
0
e−
1
2 (av
2−2dv+e)2e
(cv+b)2
2 a
√
2π
a
√
a
(cv + b + av )dv
=
1
πσXσY
√
2π
a
√
a
∫ +∞
0
e−
1
2a((a2−c2)v2−2v(ad+cb)+ae−b2)dv
=
1
πσXσY
√
2π
a
√
a
e
ab2+ad2−a2e+c2e+2bcd
2(a2−c2)
∫ +∞
0
((c + a)v + b) e
− 12a
(
(a2−c2)v−(ad+cb)√
a(a2−c2)
)2
dv︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
With 2 variable changes
J =
∫ +∞
0
((c + a)v + b) e
− 12a
(
(a2−c2)v−(ad+cb)√
a(a2−c2)
)2
dv
= a
a + c
a2 − c2
∫ +∞
0
v(a2 − c2)− (ad + bc)
a
e
− 12a
(
(a2−c2)v−(ad+cb)√
a2−c2
)2
dv
+
(
b +
ad + bc
a− c
)∫ +∞
0
e
− 12a
(
(a2−c2)v−(ad+cb)√
a2−c2
)2
dv
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=
a
a− c
∫ +∞(
− ad+cb√
2a(a2−c2)
)2 e−zdz + (b + ad + bc
a− c
)√
2
a
a2 − c2
∫ +∞
− ad+cb√
2a(a2−c2)
e−z
2
dz
=
a
a− ce
− (ad+cb)2
2a(a2−c2) + a
(
b + d
a− c
)√
2πa
a2 − c2N
(
ad + cb√
a(a2 − c2)
)
Then
E(X |X > Y ) = 1
πσXσY
√
2π
a
√
a
e
ab2+ad2−a2e+c2e+2bcd
2(a2−c2)(
a
a− ce
− (ad+cb)2
2a(a2−c2) + a
(
b + d
a− c
)√
2πa
a2 − c2N
(
ad + cb√
a(a2 − c2)
))
E(X |X > Y ) = 1σXσY
√
2
π
e
b2−ae
2a√
a(a−c) +
1
σXσY
√
2
a
√
a
e
ab2+ad2−a2e+c2e+2bcd
2(a2−c2)
a
(
b + d
a− c
)√
a
a2 − c2N
(
ad + cb√
a(a2 − c2)
)
We could replace now a, b, c, d and e:
1
σXσY
√
2
π
1√
a(a− c) =
1√
2π
σ2X√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
b2 − ae
2a
= − (μX − μY )
2
2(σ2X + σ
2
Y )
ab2 + ad2 − a2e + c2e + 2bcd = 0
1
σXσY
(
b + d
a− c
)√
1
a2 − c2 =
1
2
μX
ad + bc√
a(a2 − c2) =
μX − μY√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
Finally
E(X |X > Y ) = μXN
(
μX − μY√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
)
+
σ2X√
2π
√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
e
− 12
(
μX−μY√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
)2
As E(X |X > Y ) + E(X |X < Y ) = E(X), we obtain
E(X |X > Y ) = μXN
(
−μX + μY√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
)
− σ
2
X√
2π
√
σ2X + σ
2
Y
e
− 12
(
μX−μY√
σ2
X
+σ2
Y
)2
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